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Norms, Institutions, and Robots
Stevan Tomic, Federico Pecora and Alessandro Saffiotti
Abstract—Interactions within human societies are usually reg-
ulated by social norms. If robots are to be accepted into human
society, it is essential that they are aware of and capable of
reasoning about social norms. In this paper, we focus on how
to represent social norms in societies with humans and robots,
and how artificial agents such as robots can reason about social
norms in order to plan appropriate behavior. We use the notion
of institution as a way to formally define and encapsulate norms.
We provide a formal framework built around the notion of
institution. The framework distinguishes between abstract norms
and their semantics in a concrete domain, hence allowing the use
of the same institution across physical domains and agent types.
It also provides a formal computational framework for norm
verification, planning, and plan execution in a domain.
Index Terms—Norms, Institutions, Institutional Robotics
I. INTRODUCTION
Norms are salient and well established part of our everyday
routines. Norms are “rules” that guide our behavior, help
coordinate our activities, and help us make decisions. By
constraining our activities in various social situations, norms
make behaviors predictable. Failure to cope with norms causes
difficulties to account for the intentions behind one’s behavior.
Such situations can easily be evaluated as odd, amusing,
dumb, or even uncanny. Robots today cannot yet follow social
norms, hence often their behavior is judged in such manner. If
robots are to be accepted into human society, it is essential to
provide them with a means to cope with the social situations
in which they find themselves. To achieve this, we must
provide robots with social awareness, that is, the ability to
reason about social norms. In this paper we focus on how
to employ social norms in societies with humans and robots.
We encapsulate a set of norms in a concept called institution.
Institutions describe social situations, define roles in social
interactions, and provide a normative dimension by binding
roles to obligations, prohibitions and permissions. Institutions
thus pave the way to encode possible social dynamics between
agents and possibly between robots. Furthermore, humans use
institutions to coordinate behaviors inside a society, thus they
are sometimes addressed as “coordination artifacts” [1]. There
is no reason that robots cannot do the same to coordinate their
activities.
Our goal is to formally define an institution as an abstraction
that can be applied to a different sets of heterogeneous agents
(e.g., robots, humans) which are not specifically built to work
together, or even to be aware of the concept of institution itself.
How to design agents so that they are capable of behaving
as an institution requires is an open research question (see
Weiss [2], Chapter 2). This problem is even more significant
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when agents are physically embodied robots, since it is much
harder to create robots from scratch to fit given institution
requirements. Robots are built by different manufacturers, are
usually not specifically designed to work within a particular
institution. It would not be sensible or economical to build
robots that cater to specific norms, as this would restrict the
the social contexts in which they can be used. Conversely,
robots should be able to reason about the roles they play in a
particular institution, the obligations that they have to fulfill,
while using corresponding artifacts to do so. This spawns a
need to create a correspondence between a robot’s domain (the
concrete environment in which it operates) and an institution
(the current social context of the robot).
In this paper, we focus on developing a normative frame-
work for robotic systems using the notion of institution. We
propose an institution framework with characteristics drawn
from its intended robotic applications and the current state
of the art. Thus, we focus on developing (A) a formal
framework of institutions which distinguishes between abstract
norms and their instantiation into a concrete domain, as well
as (B) a full computational framework which enables norm
verification, planning, and plan execution by robots. Support
for (C) artifacts is of high importance in robotics, since robots
and humans interact and coordinate via relevant objects in the
environment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an
overview of the state of the art in norms and institutions. We
introduce our notion of norms, institutions and domains in
Section III. In the same section we identify basic requirements
to relate a domain with an institution, and how abstract
norms are given domain-specific semantics. In Section IV
we define the formal properties of our framework, and state
the associated reasoning problems. In Section V we define
a computational framework for reasoning about institutions.
Section VI explains the practicalities of using this computa-
tional framework over a simple trading example, and we then
demonstrate how the framework is used with real robots in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Our analysis of state of the art begins at the investigation
of general concepts of norms. An extensive overview of social
norms in the literature is given by Boella et al. [3], who
observe that research on norms is rooted in different areas,
including philosophy [4] and sociology [5]. It is noted that
concepts and theories from other disciplines should be used
for normative specifications in computer science. For example,
Therborn [6] notes that norms are not fixed in the given
environment, thus suggesting that normative models sould be
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In Computer Science, prominent work on norms was done
by Meyer and Wieringa [7], which led to deontic logic becom-
ing a dominant tool for modeling norms. The reason lies in the
lack of other methods to define beaviors which are illegal but
nevertheless possible, since illegal behavior is usually ruled
out by problem specification. Alechina et al. [8] stresses the
importance of operational semantics for normative languages,
which will allow for creating computational frameworks. Fur-
thermore, they compare different frameworks and recognize
important questions regarding the design of normative systems,
including weather or not current computational tools are ready
to deal with norms and their semantics, and which tools
are best for monitoring, analyzing, checking and executing
normative coherent behaviors. The Authors also discuss the
problem of variety of social norms and the lack of “one-size-
fits-all” normative formalism. Another well known question
in the normative literature concerns the autonomy of agents:
how autonomous is an agent if it participates in a normative
system? This is addressed by Dignum [9], who propose to
assing levels of autonomoy that depend on the type of norm
(private-, contract-, and conventional-level norms). In general,
there is consensus in the literature that in normative systems
for open worlds, heterogeneous agents could decide to break
a norm if they decide that they are better off paying the price
for violating it. As we will see, many of the specific choices
made in our framework stem from such general questions.
Much work has been done on institutions and organizational
structures in the field of multi-agents systems (MAS). Insti-
tutions are commonly described as a normative approach to
organizations, a set of norms [2], or as “rules of the game in
the society” [10]. In a majority of existing frameworks, norm
specification is clearly separated from the agents. For example,
Hannoun et al. [11] identify the notions of organizational
structure and organizational entity. The former concerns roles,
groups and links, independently from the agents in the struc-
ture; the latter concerns the agents in the organizational struc-
ture. This framework was later extended [12] to support inher-
itance relations between roles, and additional functional and
deontic layers. Its implementation is called S-MOISE+ [13].
In these frameworks, norms cannot be violated, and there is
no formal model. This hinders the analysis of formal and
computational properties of normative systems. On the more
formal side, there is OPERA [14], which also separates organi-
zational model from social level and interaction model. Here,
the social level is used to associate agents in the interaction
model with roles in the organizational model, by means of
a so-called “social contract”. These associations follow rules
regarding, e.g., agent capabilities and plans Dastani et al. [15].
Both OPERA and MOISE+ allow to define an organizational
structure and to specify high-level norms that are independent
of the agents. OperettA [16] provides a computational tool and
graphical editor that can be used to ensure that institutions
are well-formed by design. Another example of early work in
this area is ISLANDER, a tool for specifying and designing
electronic institutions [17]. The key aspect here is that norms
cannot be violated, and the tool supports the verification
of integrity (adherence to institution definition) and liveness
of the multi-agent system. One of the first frameworks that
models artifacts as a part of the organizational infrastructure
is the Agents and Artifacts (A&A) framework [18]. Also, a
variety of normative frameworks have been developed to work
with Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agents, since beliefs can
be used to provide some level of autonomy from norms. In
summary, normative frameworks in MAS are very general,
and abstract much of details of concrete agents. However, they
often lack the ability to verify/enforce formal properties, such
as the verification or generation of normative behavior. Most
also lack a means equip the agents with planning and plan
execution mechanisms.
There are two practical reasons to enable reasoning with
norms in robotics systems. First, the natural (normative) flow
of behavior dynamics is an important aspect of Human Robot
Interaction [19]. Second, norms often constitute predefined
(commonly accepted) rules which lower the need for commu-
nication between robots. This idea is demonstrated by Shoham
and Tennenholtz [20], who used norms to regulate small
mobile robots in traffic, eliminating the need for constant
negotiation and centralized control. At the current level of
technological advancement, one of the most researched topic
in robotics is navigation and localization, which also inspires
research on navigation norms. Sisbot et al. [21] argues that
human-aware motion planning has to provide safe and socially
acceptable paths. A sequence of robot behaviors is usually
generated in the form of plans. Norms in automated planning
have been studied by Panagiotidi et al. [22], who extended
the STRIPS language to include norm semantics. A goal
state is then a state of the world where the effects of all
active norms are achieved. Cirillo et al. [23], Montreuil et al.
[24], Pecora et al. [25] extend planning to support human
activities. Ko¨ckemann et al. [26] have developed the notion
of interaction constraints relating robot actions and human
activities, thus allowing for norm-aware plans to be generated.
In our previous work [27], we have introduced Socially Aware
Planner (SAP) with a support of so called social norms. With
social norms we were able to relate the current social context
with a concrete robots and humans activities. In summary,
several approaches for (robot) planning account for norms
and/or other human requirements. In most approaches, for-
mal properties and relevant computational problems are well
deinfed. However, none of the approaches provide a means to
represent norms independently of the domain, and usually any
abstraction of normative rules is very simple or non-existent.
A notable exception is the work by Carlucci et al. [28], in
which norm specifications are separate from the domain.
Institutions have received much less attention in the field of
Robotics. An institutional framework for robots was developed
by Pereira et al. [29] Institutions are defined in terms of
Petri Nets, which gives the framework a sound mathematical
foundation, but falls short of including task planning. Silva
et al. [30] proposes an “’Institutional Robotics” framework
for use with robots in environments populated by humans.
In contrast with HRI research, which usually focuses on
close interactions between humans and robots, institutional
robotics framework focuses on many-to-many human-robot
interactions.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 3
III. INSTITUTIONS AND DOMAINS
In this section we formally define the notions of institution,
norm and domain. The formalization clearly separates all
aspects of the institution abstraction from the concrete domain
of agents. Also, we define the notion of grounding, a relation
that associates an institution with a domain.
A. Institutions
The ingredients that define an institution at an abstract level
are a set of artifacts, a set of roles, a set of actions, and a set
of norms that link roles, actions and artifacts. If we take as
an example the game of football (soccer), artifacts include a
ball, a field and two goals; roles include goalkeeper, player,
referee and audience; actions include defending, scoring, and
attacking; and norms regulate how actions are performed, e.g.,
“a player should attack the opposite goal”, or “a goalkeeper
can handle the ball while in the penalty area”.
More formally, let these sets be:
Arts = {art1, art2, . . . , arta}
Roles = {role1, role2, . . . , rolem}
Acts = {act1, act2, . . . , actk}
We define a normative statement, or simply norm, to be a
predication over ground statements, where a ground statement
is a relation between a subject, a predicate and an object.
Definition 1. A norm is a statement of the form q(trp∗),
where q is a qualifier and trp∗ are triples of the form:
trp ∈ Roles× Acts× (Arts ∪ Roles)
Qualifiers are verbs like must or must-not, or relations like
inside or before. By talking about ground statements, qualifiers
define the normative language of an institution. For example, a
unary qualifier representing necessity can be used to express an
obligation like “a goal-keeper must defend its goal”. Qualifiers
defined over pairs of statements can, for example, express
temporal concepts such as “before”, “during”, etc. In our
formalization, we distinguish between obligation norms, that
impose obligatory actions, and modal norms, that describe
other requirements on statements.
An obligation norm has a unary qualifier denoting that the
action in the statement must be executed. The qualifier could
indicate that it is necessary to execute the action at least once,
or that it should be executed repeatedly. An obligation norm
may express that for example that “a goal-keeper must defend
its goal” as must ((goal-keeper,defend, ownGoal)), or that
“a buyer must pay a seller” as must ((buyer,pay, seller)).
A modal norm can encode aspects of where and how
actions should be carried out, for instance, the fact that
“a player plays inside a football-field” can be repre-
sented as inside ((player,plays, footballField)). A modal
norms can have a n-ary qualifier, which can be used to
specify a relation between two or more statements, like
in before ((customer,pays,money) , (waiter, serves, food)),
representing “the customer pays money before the waiter
serves food”. One can also define norms that state which
actions are forbidden in an institution using a unary qualifier
must not, e.g., mustNot ((referee,play, footballField)).
Obligation norms and modal norms predicate over state-
ments. We define a third type of norm that predicates over
roles, namely, indicating the normative minimum and maxi-
mum number of agents that can enact (play) a certain role,
e.g., “there can be only one goalkeeper (per team)”.
Definition 2. A cardinality norm associates roles to minimum
and maximum cardinality:
card : Roles→ N× N
We can now define an institution as follows:
Definition 3. An institution is a tuple
I = 〈Arts,Roles,Acts,Norms〉,
where Norms = OBN ∪ MON ∪ {card} is a collection of
obligation, modal and cardinality norms.
The above formalization is in line with the literature in
social and economical sciences, where institutions are typically
seen as mechanisms that regulate social action by defining and
upholding norms [31]. It is also in agreement with North [10],
who sees institutions as containers of the “rules of the game
in a society”, and with Harre´ and Secord [32], who stress the
importance of roles, seen as “normative concept[s], focusing
on what is proper for a person in a particular category to do”.
An institution is an abstraction. As such, it can be instan-
tiated in different concrete systems, which may be physically
different but have the same organizational structure. For in-
stance, the same football institution can be used to regulate
a game played by a group of children and one played by a
group of robots. In the next section we formalize the notion
of a “concrete system”, and in following one we see how to
connect an institution and a concrete system.
B. Domain
Definition 4. A domain is a tuple D = 〈A,O,B, F,R〉, where
• A is a set of agents,
• O is a set of physical entities,
• B is a set of behaviors,
• F ⊆ A×B × (O ∪A) is a set of affordances,
• R is a finite set of state variables
The Agents A could be a mix of humans and robots, e.g.,
{Tom,Sally,Ann,Nao3,Roomba1,Turtlebot4}.
B is the set of all behaviors in the domain, e.g.,
{walk,play, talk,dance, run}.
Physical entities O are ordinary objects in the domain, e.g.,
{whiteboard,ball,floor, chair,meadow,brush}.
Since agents are assumed to be heterogeneous, the affordance
relation F indicates which agents can execute which behaviors
with which object, e.g.,
{(Sally,walk,floor) , (Nao3,play,ball) ,
(Roomba1, clean,brush)}.
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Fig. 1. An example of a trajectory visualized in the state space. It consists
of 9 time points and describes an attacking sequence of agent Nao.
The state variables R define different properties pertaining to
the entities in the domain. They may indicate the position of
an object, the color of an agent, the status of activation of a
behavior, etc. For instance, ρ = active(walk,Nao3) is a state
variable that indicates whether the walk behavior is active on
the agent Nao3. We denote with vals(ρ) the set of possbile
values of state variable ρ, e.g., vals(active(walk,Nao3)) =
{>,⊥}. Some other state variable pos(ball1), for instance,
can indicate the qualitative position of an object:
vals(pos(ball1)) = {back-half, front-half, goal-area, . . . }.
In a different domain, the pos state variable may hold values
of coordinates in a given coordinate system.
Definition 5. Given a domain D = 〈A,O,B, F,R〉, the state
space of D is S = ∏ρ∈R vals(ρ), where vals(ρ) are the
possible values of the state-variable ρ. The value v of ρ in
state s ∈ S is denoted ρ(s).
In a dynamic environment, the values of most properties
change over time. In our formalization, we represent time
points by natural numbers in N, and time intervals by pairs
I = [t1, t2] such that t1, t2 ∈ N and t1 ≤ t2. We denote
by I the set of all such time intervals. We then represent the
evolution of properties over time by trajectories of states.
Definition 6. A trajectory is a pair (I, τ), where I ∈ I is a
time interval and τ : I → S maps time to states.
Figure 1 shows an example trajectory in the space defined by
three state variables: position(ball1), active(moveTo,Nao)
and active(shoot,Nao). The agent Nao engages in behaviors
moveTo and shoot until the ball is in the goal. At time t1
the ball is at goal1Area. At t2 and t3 the ball is in the
same position, and the agent’s behavior moveTo is active:
active(moveTo,Nao)(τ(t3)) = >. At t4 moveTo finishes and
Nao shoots the ball: active(shoot,Nao)(τ(t4)) = >. At t5 the
ball is in a new position: position(ball1)(τ(t5)) = goal2Area.
A similar sequence repeats, until the ball’s position is Goal2.
Fig. 2. The institution model, with a domain and grounding
C. Grounding
An important concept we must consider in dealing with
institutions and norms is how to ground these in a domain.
Definition 7. Given an institution I and a domain D, a
grounding of I into D is a tuple G = 〈GA,GB ,GO〉, where:
• GA : A→ Roles is a role grounding,
• GB ⊆ Acts×B is an action grounding,
• GO ⊆ Arts×O is an artifact grounding.
Having our football institution in mind, imagine a specific
domain consisting of a group of children in a meadow who
have just decided to play football. For that they have to
organize, that is, achieve all the requirements of the football
institution. For example, they could decide that the two goal
posts will be (grounded as) two trees, that the football field
will (grounded as) the meadow. This corresponds to our
notion of artifact grounding, GO. Institutional artifacts, like
the football field, are related to a concrete concept in the
real world, like the meadow: (meadow, footballField) ∈ GO.
Furthermore, they have to decide which roles they are going
to play by dividing into teams and deciding who gets to be
goalkeeper. This corresponds to role grounding, GA, where,
e.g., the role of a goal-keeper is assigned to the child named
Tom: (goalkeeper,Tom) ∈ GA. Finally, particular behaviors
of children, like shooting or blocking the ball, can be used to
realize institutional actions, like attacking or defending. This is
modeled by the action grounding GB , e.g., (Attack, shoot) ∈
GB . An institution, domain and grounding can be represented
graphically, as shown in Figure 2.
Joining or leaving the institution is regulated by simply
changing GA. Now imagine a different domain, where the
football game is played by robots, like at RoboCup com-
petitions. In this case, the same football institution can be
used by grounding it to the RoboCup domain. Thus, particular
robots can be assigned to the player and goalkeeper roles, their
behaviors to the specific institutional actions, and the ball and
field to the corresponding institutional artifacts. Yet another
gounding may involve a combination of robotic and human
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agents. Overall, grounding enables reasoning in mixed human
robots societies, and may even be a concrete way of achieving
the ultimate goal of RoboCup, namely, to enable a team of
robot to play against humans under FIFA rules.
Note that grounding GA is a function. This is due to a fact
that several roles cannot be played by one agent. However,
GB and GO are relations. This means that one behavior could
provide several institution actions, and that one object could
be associated with different institution artifacts.
The grounding of an institution to a domain has some
important philosophical connotations. The grounding G gives
a certain institutional meaning (a status) to domain elements.
This fact is known as a the “count as principle” [33]. Searle
[34] explain this principle as assigning “status functions” to
elements, so that X counts as Y in context C. A classical
examples of this notion is that a specific piece of paper counts
as money in a trading institution, or that a certain pattern of
positions counts as checkmate in a game of chess. Putting
a paper in the box could count as voting in the election
institution. Behaviors that are in the “count as” relationship
with institutional actions are also referred to as having insti-
tutional power [33]. Furthermore, interpreting a behavior in
the domain as an institutional action is sometimes also called
“conventional generation” [35].
There are certain requirements for an arbitrary agent to be
able to be part of an institution. These requirements will be
identified and formally defined in section IV-A.
D. Norm Semantics
So far we have been concerned with the general notion of
norms, as a modality on a statement within an institution.
As such, it is unclear what norms mean in a domain. For
example what does must ((buyer,pay, goods)) mean with
respect to a particular domain? The semantics of this norm
can be defined as all trajectories where the action pay
is executed at least once. The semantics of a norm like
before ((buyer,pays,money) , (buyer, takes, goods)) can be
defined as all trajectories where the behavior that is grounded
to the pay action behavior happens before the behavior that
is grounded to the takes action. More formally, let T be the
set of all possible trajectories (I, τ) over the state-variables in
domain D. We define a semantic function J·K as:
Jr(stm∗)K ⊆ T
A variety of norms in the real world can be expressed
as a relation on trajectories, that is, the possible values that
state variables take over time. For example, being silent in
certain situations means that state variable volume of a certain
behavior needs to be at lower levels or turned off; or the
fact that some behavior should be executed only in certain
places relates the activation of the behavior to the position
state variable of the place in question. Our formal definition
of semantics is coherent with this reasoning, since trajectories
are defined over such state variables. In the following, we
provide semantics for a selection of norms. It is important to
note that these examples are not an extensive list of norms
and semantics used in our framework. They are merely an
example of the kinds of semantics that can be defined over
state variables in the domain.
E. Examples of Semantics
For convenience, henceforth we define the set of all agents
to which a specific role is grounded to as Arole = G−1(role);
the set of all behaviors to which an action act is grounded to
is Bact = {b | b ∈ B ∧ (act, b) ∈ GB}; and the set of all
objects to which an artifact art is grounded to is Oart = {o |
o ∈ O ∧ (art, o) ∈ GO}. We also assume that the set of state
variables R in the domain D = 〈A,O,B, F,R〉 contains state
variable active(b, ag) for every pair of (b, ag) ∈ B × A. The
values vals(active(b, ag)) = {>,⊥}, and agent ag executes
behavior b in state s iff active(b, ag)(s) = >.
Must execute (at least) once. The semantics of this norm,
should make sure that a certain behavior is active at least once
in the given trajectory:
Jmust ((role, act, art))K ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, t) ∈ Bact × I :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = >}.
The semantics of this norm is defined as all trajectories (I, τ),
where for each agent playing a role, there exists at least one
behavior in the grounding of act that is active for that agent
at some time t. Variants of this semantics are possible, e.g.,
stating that the behavior should be enacted at all times (not
just once in the trajectory). Notice that art in the norm is
ignored, since it is not of interest for the semantic definition
of this norm. However, it may be relevant in other norms, as
in the following example.
At. This is an example of norm with a spatial semantics:
J at ((role, act, art))K ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(b, a, t) ∈ Bact ×Arole × I.∃o ∈ Oart :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒
position(b, a)(τ(t)) = position(o)(τ(t))}.
All agents in the role grounding for which behaviors grounded
by the action are active should have the same position as the
position of at least one artifact in the artifact grounding. This
simple semantic model can, of course, be changed to encode
more sophisticated spatial relations, e.g., the object has to be
within certain boundaries of another object.
Use. This is another another useful norm, whose semantics
can be defined as:
J use ((role, act, art))K ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(b, a, t) ∈ Bact ×Arole × I.∃o ∈ Oart :
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒ usedObject(b, a)(τ(t)) = o}.
Similarly to the semantics of at, this states that all agents in the
role grounding with behaviors in the action grounding that are
active should use the same object (in the artifact grounding).
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Before. A semantic model for this temporal norm is the
following:
Jbefore ((role1, act1, art1), (role2, act2, art2))K ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(a1, a2, b1, b2) ∈ Arole1 ×Arole2 ×Bact1 ×Bact2
active(b1, a1)(τ(t1)) = > ∧ active(b2, a2)(τ(t2)) = >
=⇒ t1 < t2}
This states that all behaviors in the action grounding, if active,
have to be in certain order: the first should precede the second
second. The semantic model could be even more specific,
addressing exact objects with which actions are performed.
In a similar way, it is also possible to model the qualitative
temporal relations in Allen’s Interval Algebra [36].
The examples above are meant to illustrate the process of
giving semantics to norms on a few concrete cases. In general,
whenever we ground an institution I to a domain D, we must
make sure that all of the modalities used to define norms in
I are given semantics in terms of properties in D, as we have
done above for execute, at, use and before.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY AND ADHERENCE
In this section we define two formal properties that must
be upheld for a grounding to correctly pair an institution
to a domain with given state space dynamics. The first
property, admissibility, pertains to a grounding. An admissible
grounding is one that achieves a correspondence between the
relations in the institution and the relations in the domain of
interest that satisfies some key properties. These properties are
defined through a series of conditions. The second property,
adherence, relates norms, groundings and trajectories. An
adherent trajectory is one that adheres to all norms in the
institution, given their semantics and an admissible grounding.
A. Admissibility
The agents to which a role is grounded should be ca-
pable to execute actions with the specific artifacts required
by obligation norms. This means that agents should be ca-
pable of executing at least one behavior among those to
which obligied action is grounded to, with at least one
object for each relevant artifact among those to which
the artifact is grounded to. For example, given the obli-
gation norm execute ((Goalkeeper,Defend,OwnGoal)), the
grounding G = 〈GA,GB ,GO〉 such that GA(Nao) =
Goalkeeper, (Defend,block) ∈ GB and (OwnGoal, goal1) ∈
GO, then Nao must be able to use block behavior for goal1.
In general,
Definition 8. Given a grounding G, an obligation norm
r(role, act, art) ∈ OBN is executable iff
∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, o) ∈ Bact ×Oart : (a, b, o) ∈ F.
Similarly, if the obligation norm requires another role as
an object for the particular action, it is required that this
norm is also executable. In football, for instance, there may
be offensive and defensive roles, hence, there could be an
obligation norm like “a defensive player must stay behind
an attacking player”. If Tom is in a defensive role, he
must execute any behavior that is grounded to that role in
accordance with the offensive player Nao. In general,
Definition 9. Given a grounding G, an obligation norm
r(role, act, roleo) ∈ OBN is executable iff
∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, ao) ∈ Bact ×Aroleo : (a, b, ao) ∈ F.
Another important condition of grounding is related to
cardinality of norms.
Definition 10. Given grounding G, a cardinality norm card is
satisfied for role role ∈ Role iff
min (card(role)) ≤ |Arole| ≤ max (card(role)) .
Putting the two conditions together:
Definition 11. Given an institution I, a grounding G is
admissible iff all obligation norms are executable and the
cardinality norm is satisfied for all roles.
Admissibility of grounding ensures that all obligation norms
can indeed be executed in a domain with the agents, behaviors
and objects grounded by the institution.
B. Adherence
The admissibility property of grounding is not concerned
with semantics, nor with the dynamic aspects of the domain.
In our framework, dynamic aspects are captured by trajecto-
ries. Trajectories can be planned/generated to obtain different
sequences of behaviors, with different durations, and with
different temporal delays between them. Given an institution,
admissible grounding and norm semantics, a trajectory may or
may not adhere to the institution’s norms. With the admissible
property alone, we cannot talk about weather trajectories
satisfy the institution’s norms. The existence of a trajectory
that satisfies these norms, besides reflecting an admissible
grounding, depends on the specific semantics of the norms.
For example, adding a norm with certain temporal semantics,
such as a minimum duration for actions, or a deadline for
executing an obliged action, would reduce the set of possible
adherent trajectories by ruling out those that do not satisfy to
these constraints.
Admissibility is a necessary condition for norm satisfaction
in an institution, but it is not sufficient. Thus, we define the
following notion.
Definition 12. A trajectory (I, τ) adheres to an institution
I = 〈Arts,Roles,Acts,Norms〉, with admissible grounding
G = 〈GA,GB ,GO〉 and given semantics function J·K, if
(I, τ) ∈ JnormK,∀norm ∈ Norms.
C. Reasoning Problems
An institution, grounding, trajectory, domain, and semantics
could be known (given); or some or all of these elements may
have to be inferred or calculated. Different combinations of
what is given in a particular situation leads to different kinds of
computational problems. Table I helps us identify and classify
interesting problems in a systematic way.
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a) Verification: The problem here is to ensure that the
given trajectory adheres the given institution with grounding,
domain and semantics. In other words, if the trajectory (I, τ)
adheres to the institution I, then it follows that (I, τ) does not
violate any of the institution’s norms. For example, a trajectory
representing a football game where all players adhere to all
norms at all times will pass the verification test, whereas one
in which a defender goes off-side will not.
b) Grounding: The task is to find an admissible ground-
ing. The grounding must be such that it follows the admissibil-
ity conditions in section IV-A. For instance, a football player
must be able to kick a ball in order to be assigned to that role
(regarding the role grounding); and kicking can be grounded
to a “pushing” behavior for agents without legs.
c) Planning: Planning, or generation/synthesis problems,
may be of two kinds. Both require to generate a trajectory
in the domain that is adherent to the institution, grounding
and semantics. For instance, to generate a trajectory such that
an agent (the buyer) receives goods and another agent (the
seller) receives payment, thus not breaking the norms given
by the trading institution. In one case, the agents, behaviors
and objects involved in planning are fixed, since they are
already determined by grounding; in the other case, these
are not assumed to be known, thus allowing the planner to
choose agents, behaviors and objects as long as the grounding
is admissible.
d) Recognition: The task in recognition problems is to
recognize which agents, behaviors and objects belong to which
institutional elements. For example, what is the role of a
person standing in front of a goal during a football game?
e) Relational Learning: We can identify a relational
learning (RL) problem when the task is to find normative
relations or semantics from a given trajectory in a given
domain for given institution and grounding. That is, we
need to answer questions like “what does it mean to use
a paymentUnit?”, or more precisely, what are the rules
regulating how an agent (a buyer) should behave to satisfy
the norm use ((buyer,pay,paymentUnit))?
f) Institution Learning/Recognition: Institution learning
is the problem of learning institution structure by observing
the dynamics of agents interaction. Institution recognition
addresses the case where institutions are already defined, and
the problem is to recognize which institution is taking place
and how it is grounded within the observed domain. For
example, if two persons are playing with a ball, are they
playing a game of football, basketball or tennis?
In the continuation of this paper we focus our attention on
formalization, representation and analysis of the verification
problem. The planning problem is addressed in less detail via
an example in Section VII.
V. COMPUTATION
We now focus on defining the verification problem dis-
cussed in the previous section (row I in Table I). We also
introduce specific assumptions that allow to reduce the ver-
ification problem to a known decision problem. Finally we
discuss how verification can be used to enable planning.
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF REASONING PROBLEMS WITH INSTITUTIONS. LEGEND:
> = GIVEN, x = TO BE FOUND, (x) = NOT OF INTEREST.
Problem I G (τ, I) D J·K
Verification > > > > >
Planning(1) > > x > >
Recognition > x > > >
Relational Learning > > > > x
Planning(2) > x x > >
Grounding > x (x) > >
I Learning/Recognition x x > > >
A. Formulation as Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP)
An institution, admissible grounding, norm semantics, and
domain can be naturally expressed as a collection of con-
straints over state variables. Specifically, given an institution I,
grounding G, semantics J·K, and domain D = 〈A,O,B, F,R〉,
we can construct a constraint network (W, C) where W is a
set of variables and C is a set of constraints over W . For
each ρ ∈ R there is a w ∈ W whose domain dom(w) =
{f : I → vals(ρ)}, where I ⊆ N ∪ {0}. There is a one-to-
one correspondence between the norm semantics as defined
in Section III-D and constraints as defined here, since each
semantic limits the possible trajectories in the state space.
Norm semantics are defined over state variables R, while
constraints are defined over the corresponding w ∈ W . For
instance, the constraint corresponding to the obligation norm
with semantics must is:
CJmust((role,act,art))K ≡
∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, t) ∈ Bact × I : wactive(b,a)(t) = >.
An assignment of values to the variables W that satisfies all
constraints in C thus represents a particular trajectory that
adheres to the institution. Thus, the problem of finding an
adherent trajectory in an institution is reduced to the Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (CSP) [37].
A trajectory defines values for all state-variables. It is
therefore possible to represent a trajectory as a collection of
unary constraints over variables. Given trajectory (I, τ) in
the state space defined by R, we can obtain a set of unary
constraints C(I,τ) = ∪ρ∈RCρ, where
Cρ ≡ wρ(t) = ρ(τ(t)),∀t ∈ I.
The constraint network (W, C) represents the institution,
grounding and semantics, while (W, C(I,τ)) represents a given
trajectory (I, τ). Thus, the constraint network
(W, C ∪ C(I,τ))
has a solution if and only if trajectory (I, τ) adheres to the
institution with given grounding and semantics. This addresses
the verification problem listed in Table I. This computational
model is clearly too complex to be practical, as variables may
take on values representing any trajecotry in state space. We
therefore put several assumptions in place which make the
verification problem feasible. These are in line with assump-
tions commonly made in the temporal planning literature, as
we explain below.
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B. Solving the Verification Problem
Constraints in the current representation have to be checked
at each time point in the interval I of a given trajectory. In or-
der to keep the computational problem feasible, it is reasonable
to make some assumptions on how state variable values can
evolve over time. Henceforth, we assume a piece-wise constant
temporal functions for trajectories. Hence, constraint checking
need not consider each time point in I , rather each contiguous
interval for which state variables have constant values. This
assumption is commonly made in temporal planning as well
as scheduling, as it allows to reason about the temporal
sub-problem via temporal constraint reasoning methods like
Simple Temporal Problems [38]. Timeline-based planning
approaches use this assumption to reduce the planning problem
to that of constructing trajectories in state space [39, 40],
integrating planning and scheduling [41], and hybrid-reasoning
for robots [42]. In all these approaches, the variables in the
underlying CSP represent flexible intervals of time within
which a state variable assumes a constant value. Constraints
in the CSP typically only concern the temporal aspect of the
problem, that is, regulating the relative placement in time
of intervals of constant values of state variables. The values
themselves, as well as the number of fixed-value intervals, are
decided by decision processes at higher levels of abstraction.
In our verification problem, the trajectory is known, that is,
the values of state variables over time are known. We can use
this to construct a trajecotry-specific constraint network as fol-
lows. Let I be an institution with grounding G, semantics J·K,
and domain D = 〈A,O,B, F,R〉, and let (I, τ) be a trajecotry
for the state variables R. Assume that ρ(τ(t)) ∈ {v¯1, . . . , v¯d}
for all t ∈ I , that is, trajectory (I, τ) states that each state
variable ρ ∈ R takes on one of a finite set of discrete values
in vals(ρ). We construct a constraint network (W, C) where
W = {wρ,i | ρ ∈ R ∧ ∃I¯ ⊆ I : ρ(τ(t)) = v¯i,∀t ∈ I¯}. The
constraints C are still derived directly from norm semantics,
however the scope of the constraints now includes all of the
sub-variables wρ,i of a given state variable. For instance, the
semantics of norms must ((role, act, art)), at ((role, act, art))
and use ((role, act, art)) may lead to the following constraints:
CJmust((role,act,art))K ≡
∀a ∈ Arole.∃(b, I¯) ∈ Bact × I : wactive(b,a)(I¯) = >,
CJat((role,act,art))K ≡
∀(a, b, I¯) ∈ Arole× ∈ Bact × I.∃o ∈ Oart :
wactive(b,a)(I¯) = > =⇒ wposition(b,a)(I¯) = wposition(o)(I¯)),
CJuse((role,act,art))K ≡
∀(a, b, I¯) ∈ Arole ×Bact × I.∃o ∈ Oart :
wactive(b,a)(I¯) = > =⇒ wusedObject(b,a)(I¯) = o.
C. Planning via Verification
As stated, planning requires to identify a trajectory that
adheres to an institution’s norms with given semantics. The
CSP reduction shown above is appropriate for verifying
candidate plans such as those considered by timeline-based
planning approaches: these planners typically search the space
of possible “timelines” of state variables. The collection of
these timelines is typically represented exactly as we have
done above, in the form of a constraint network with as many
variables as there are constant-valued intervals of time. These
planners employ constraint reasoning techniques to verify that
a candidate set of timelines (i.e., a candidate plan) adheres to
constraints given in a domain specification. Some approaches,
such as the one used for the robotic example in Section VII,
provide very expressive domain specification languages, which
include temporal, spatial, resource and other constructs [43].
This allows to express the semantics of norms directly in the
domain specification, and to leverage the planner’s ability to
search in the space of possible timelines to find an adherent
trajectory (I, τ).
VI. REASONING EXAMPLE
In this section we unfold the concepts described so far on a
trading institution. This institution consists of two roles, buyer
and a seller. The buyer pays with some form of payment
and receives purchased goods. Similarly, the seller receives
payment in some form and gives the purchased goods to





Norms = {OBN, card,Other}
The obligation norms OBN enforce that buyers and sellers pay
and give purchased goods, respectively:




Other norms regulate the transaction in time and usage of
artifacts:






Finally, cardinality ensures that there is one buyer and one
seller:
card(Buyer) = (1, 1), card(Seller) = (1, 1).
The above provides the abstract structure of a trading insti-
tution. Now we consider a concrete realization by providing a
specific domain D = 〈A,B,O, F,R〉 and grounding G.
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A = { nao, turtlebot,Sally}
B = { give, take,moveTo}
O = { cash, creditCard,battery,
motor, cashRegister}
F = { (nao, give, cash) , (nao, give, creditCard) ,
(nao, give,battery) , (nao, give,motor) ,
(nao, take, cash) , (nao, take, creditCard) ,
(nao, take,battery) , (nao, take,motor) ,
(nao,moveTo, cashRegister) ,
(Sally, give, cash) , (Sally, give, creditCard) ,
(Sally, give,battery) , (Sally, give,motor) ,
(Sally, take, cash) , (Sally, take, creditCard) ,
(Sally, take,battery) , (Sally, take,motor)}




State variable active indicates whether a particular agent
executes a particular behavior. Similarly, usedObject indicates
whether a particular agent is using a particular object. Let the
following grounding also be given:
GA = {(Buyer,nao), (Seller,Sally)}
GB = {(Pay, give), (ReceiveGoods, take),
(ReceivePayment, take), (GiveGoods, give)}
GO = {(PayForm, cash), (Goods,battery)}
A. Admissibility
As discussed in section IV-A, a grounded agent should be
able to execute what is specified by the obligation norms, that
is, at least one behavior and one object have to be grounded
to the corresponding action and artifact, so that they afford
execution by the agent. This condition, stated in Definition 8,
is checked by Algorithm 1.
Procedure Executable checks if an obligation norm is
executable by checking if all grounded agents are capable
of executing the required act with the corresponding art.
The Capable procedure ensures that the object part of
the statements can be used by required actions grounded
to corresponding behaviors. The procedure is run for all
obligation norms so as to ensure overall admissibility (Def-
inition 11). For norm must ((Buyer,Pay,PayForm)), since
(Buyer,nao) ∈ GA (line 2), the procedure checks if nao is
capable of executing action Pay with the artifact PayForm.
Since (Pay, give) ∈ GB (line 7), (PayForm, cash) ∈ GO (line
8), and also (nao, give, cash) ∈ F (line 9), the procedure
returns true, and the obligation norm is deemed executable.
All obligation norms are verified in such a manner, and all are
executable given the domain and grounding in this example.
Also, the number of grounded agents is in the limits of
the cardinality norm (not shown in the algorithm), thus the
grounding G is admissible.
Algorithm 1: Executable
Input : r ((role, act, art)) ∈ I.OBN,D,G
Output: true iff r is executable
1 Procedure Executable(r ((role, act, art)) ,D,G)
2 for (role, ag) ∈ G.GA do
3 if ¬ Capable(ag, act, art,D,G) then
4 return false
5 return true
6 Procedure Capable(ag, act, art,D,G)
7 for (act, b) ∈ G.GB do
8 for (art, o) ∈ G.GO do
9 if (ag, b, o) ∈ D.F then
10 return true
11 return false;
Fig. 3. Two stories (trajectories) are represented by pictures. Are both of
them the part of a trading institution?
B. Adherence
Two similar trajectories are shown in Figure 3, where
each picture shows a state. Possible values of the
active(behavior, agent) state variable are > (the behavior is
active) and ⊥ (the behavior is not active). The values of all
usedObject state variables are the names of objects used in
the agent behaviors. We can describe the state for each picture
in Figure 3 using state variables (henceforth, we omit listing
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state variable states representing incative behaviors):
s1 = {∅}
s2 = {active(give,nao)(t2) = >,
usedObject(give,nao)(t2) = cash}












The stories in the figure corresponds to two trajectories, (I, τa)
and (I, τb), where I is in an interval [t1, t4]. States s1, s2, s3
are shared between the two trajectories, whereas s4 = τa(t4)
and s′4 = τb(t4) differ in the values of usedObject(take,nao)
and usedObject(give,Sally). The interesting question here is:
do these trajectories represent instances of a trading institu-
tion? To answer this, we can formulate a CSP representing
each story and verify whether it admits a solution.
C. Adherence and the CSP
The variables of the constraint network (W, C) obtained
from I, D, G and the trajecotry (I, τa) is shown in Table II.
TABLE II
VARIABLES IN W AND THEIR VALUES.
wρ,i ∈W I ⊆ I wρ,i(I)
wactive(give,nao),1 [1, 1] ⊥
wactive(give,nao),2 [2, 3] >
wactive(give,nao),3 [4, 4] ⊥
wusedObject(give,nao),1 [2, 3] cash
wactive(take,nao),1 [1, 1] ⊥
wactive(take,nao),2 [4, 4] >
wusedObject(take,nao),1 [4, 4] battery
wactive(give,Sally),1 [1, 3] ⊥
wactive(give,Sally),2 [4, 4] >
wusedObject(give,Sally),1 [4, 4] battery
wactive(take,Sally),1 [1, 2] ⊥
wactive(take,Sally),2 [3, 3] >
wactive(take,Sally),3 [4, 4] ⊥
wusedObject(take,Sally),1 [3, 3] cash
For convenience, we denote the set of agents playing a
particular role role as Arole, the set of behaviors to which
a particular action act is grounded as Bact, and the set of
objects to which an artifact art is grounded as Oart. In our
example,
ABuyer = {nao}, ASeller = {Sally},
BPay = {give}, BReceiveGoods = {take},
BReceivePayment = {take}, BGiveGoods = {give},
OPayForm = {cash}, OGoods = {battery}.
The constraints reflecting the norms in our example are
constructed as follows. For the four obligation norms, we have:
CJmust((Buyer,Pay,PayForm))K ≡
∀a ∈ ABuyer.∃b ∈ BPay : wactive(b,a)(I) = >,
CJmust((Buyer,ReceiveGoods,Goods))K ≡
∀a ∈ ABuyer.∃b ∈ BReceiveGoods : wactive(b,a)(I) = >,
CJmust((Seller,ReceivePayment,PayForm))K ≡
∀a ∈ ASeller.∃b ∈ BReceivePayment : wactive(b,a)(I) = >,
CJmust((Seller,GiveGoods,Goods))K ≡
∀a ∈ ASeller.∃b ∈ BGiveGoods : wactive(b,a)(I) = >.
It can be seen from Table II that all obligation norms
in our example are satisfied. For instance, the norm
must ((Buyer,Pay,PayForm)) is satisfied thanks to the fact
that wactive(give,nao),2([2, 3]) = >.
Among the other norms, constraints for those with use
modality ensure that if the behavior is executed, then it has to
use a certain object given by the grounding and use relations:
CJuse((Buyer,Pay,PayForm))K ≡
∃(b, a, o) ∈ BPay ×ABuyer ×OPayForm :
wactive(b,a)(I) = > =⇒ wusedObject(b,a)(I) = obj,
CJuse((Buyer,ReceiveGoods,Goods))K ≡
∃(b, a, o) ∈ BReceiveGoods ×ABuyer ×OGoods :
wactive(b,a)(I) = > =⇒ wusedObject(b,a)(I) = obj,
CJuse((Seller,ReceivePayment,PayForm))K ≡
∃(b, a, o) ∈ BReceivePayment ×ASeller ×OPayForm :
wactive(b,a)(I) = > =⇒ wusedObject(b,a)(I) = obj
CJuse((Seller,GiveGoods,Goods))K ≡
∃(b, a, o) ∈ BGivePayment ×ASeller ×OGoods :
wactive(b,a)(I) = > =⇒ wusedObject(b,a)(I) = obj.
These constraints are also satisfied; the norm
use ((Buyer,Pay,PayForm)), for instance, is satisfied
because in the intervals when nao activates the give behavior,
the used object is cash, that is, wactive(give,nao),2([2, 3]) = >
and wusedObject(give,nao),1([2, 3]) = cash.
Finally, paying and receiving actions are subject to a tem-
poral norm:
CJbefore((Buyer,Pay,PayForm),(Buyer,ReceiveGoods,Goods))K ≡
∀(b1, b2, a) ∈ BPay ×BReceiveGoods ×ABuyer,
∀[t1, t2], [t3, t4] ∈ I
wactive(b1,a)([t1, t2]) = > ∧ wactive(b2,a)([t3, t4]) = >
=⇒ t2 < t3.
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Fig. 4. A robot and a child playing the game.
The activation of the behavior regarding the statement
(Buyer,Pay,PayForm) is described by state variable
active(give,nao). It is active in interval [2, 3], as shown
in Table II. The activation of the behavior regarding state-
ment (Buyer,ReceiveGoods,Goods) is described by state
variable active(take,nao), which is active in the interval
[4, 4]. Thus, the constraint is satisfied, since paying occurs
before receiving the goods. It follows that (I, τa) adheres
to this trading institution, since all of the constraints are
satisifed. (I, τb), on the other hand, does not, as it would
lead to w′usedObject(give,Sally),1([4, 4]) = cash; this value does
not satisfy the constraint CJuse((Seller,GiveGoods,Goods))K, since
cash 6= battery.
VII. AN EXAMPLE WITH ROBOTS AND HUMANS
In this section we use our framework to regulate interac-
tions between robots and people. We employ an off-the-shelf
timeline-based planning solution which allows us to express
norm semantics in the planner’s domain definition language.
The institution we model captures the norms of a simple game
played by a robot and a child. We first illustrate the norms
that regulate the game, and then we describe how this is
instantiated with in a particular domain composed of a human
subject and a robot in our lab.
A. Game Scenario
The institution used for this example consists of a game for
children that was developed for the purpose of a Human-Robot
Interaction study [44]. Figure 4 shows a snapshot of the game
being played by a child and a robot. The game requires two
players, a Runner and a Catcher. A set of letters are marked
in different positions on the floor. The runner should visit each
letter, and the condition for moving from one to the other is
to utter a word beginning with the letter. In the meantime, the
catcher follows the runner, and the runner loses the game if the
catcher manages to reach the runner before he/she has move
on to the next letter. The runner wins if he/she has visited
all of the letters. The can be played by a parent and a child
(where, desirably, the parent takes the role of catcher, and the
child the role of runner), or with a robot and a child, or just
between two robots.
B. Setup
The game was realized in the PEIS Home environment [45]
with two robotic platforms: an “mbot”, developed in the EU
project MOnarCH [46], and a standard Turtlebot platform [47].
For the purpose of the example, an Institution Manager (IM)
was developed. This is a module which encapsulates and
implements all concepts discussed so far: from institution
specification to execution of robot behaviors. The IM per-
forms the reasoning tasks associated with institutions, namely,
grounding, creating plans (trajectories), and checking their
admissibility. Planning occurs via a timeline-based planner.
The semantics of norms can be encoded directly into the do-
main definition, thus allowing the planner to directly generate
adherent plans (see Section V-C).
C. Institution, Domain and Grounding





The norms of the institution are:
OBN = {must ((Runner,SayWord,Letter)) ,
must ((Runner,Navigate,Letter))
must ((Catcher,Catch,Runner))}
Other = { use ((Runner,SayWord,Letter)) ,
at ((Runner,SayWord,Letter))}
card(Runner) = (1, 1), card(Catcher) = (1, 1).
These two must norms oblige the runner to navigate to and say
words with all letters, and the catcher to catch the runner. The
use norm establishes the fact that saying a word “uses” a letter,
meaning that the uttered word must start with the appropriate
letter (see semantics below). The at norm links the letter that
is used with the location where the saying action takes place.
The cardinality norm states that the game is played with one
runner and one catcher.
The following domain reflects the physical setup used in
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our tests:
A = {mbot11, turtlebot1, childMaja,parentStevan}
O = { posA,posB,posC,posD,RFIDFloor}
B = {moveTo, gradientMoveTo, sayWord}













R = { position(mbot11),position(turtlebot1),
position(childMaja),position(parentStevan)}.
As specified by the affordance relation F , turtlebot1 can
move to all positions using behavior moveTo and say words
beginning with all letters using behavior sayWord. mbot11
can also say words with the same behavior, but can only
move via behavior followGradient. This behavior consists
of following a gradient that leads the robot to the current
position of an RFID reader. The gradient is obtained via the
methods described by Khaliq et al. [44] from RFID tags in
the floor. The RFDI reader is either mounted underneath a
robot, or in a special shoe that can be worn by a human
user. The (mbot11, followGradient,RFIDFloor) affordance
is therefore the capability of the robot to follow a robot
or human with a wearable RFID reader. Note that mbot11
is not capable of reaching a specific location, but only of
following another agent. For brevity, we have omitted from
F the affordances related to human agents childMaja and
parentStevan, who are assumed to be capable of all behaviors.
The state variables are used to track the position of
an agent when it says words. These positions are sym-
bolic and correspond to letters, i.e., vals(position(a, b)) =
{posA,posB,posC} for all (a, b) ∈ A×B.
The semantics the must norms is the same as shown in
Section III-D, reflecting the fact that a runner must say a
word beginning with each letter at least once, and that the
catcher must catch the runner. The use norm also has the
same semantics, expressing the fact that a letter is used to say
a word. The norm at ((Runner,SayWord,Letter)) expresses
the fact that the word uttered at a position should be a word
beginning with the letter corresponding to that position:
J at ((Runner,SayWord,Letter))K ≡
{(I, τ) | ∀(b, a, t) ∈ BSayWord ×ARunner × I
active(b, a)(τ(t)) = > =⇒
position(b, a) = usedObject(b, a)(τ(t))}.
In the experiment illustrated here, the following grounding G
was given:
GA = {(Runner, turtlebot1), (Catcher,mbot11)}
GB = {(Catch, followGradient), (Navigate,moveTo),
(SayWord, sayWord)}
GO = {(Letter,posA), (Letter,posB),
(Letter,posC), (Letter,posD)}
The grounding is admissible because it grounds the roles of
catcher and runner to robots that are capable of executing the
appropriate movement behaviors (the mbot11 is capable of
followGradient and turtlebot1 is capable of moveTo, see
definition of F in the domain); similarly, turtlebot1 is capable
of behavior sayWord.
An adherent trajectory is synthesized by a timeline-based
planner whose domain contains the semantic models of all
norms. The resulting plan was dispatched to mbot11 and
turtlebot1. The plan as executed at time t = 4 seconds is
shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Execution timeline of the plan generated with grounding G at time t =
4 seconds: mbot11 is executing behavior followGradient, while turtlebot1
is executing behavior moveTo for reaching posD.
The advantage of having modeled the game as an institution
becomes evident when we want to change the actors in the
game, which is achieved by simply using another grounding
G′, which differs from G in the agent grounding function:
G′A = {(Runner, childMaya), (Catcher,mbot11)}.
Figure 4 shows a snapshot of childMaya and mbot11 playing
the game.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we heave introduced a theoretical framework
for modeling and reasoning about norms in robotics. The
framework is grounded on the notion of institution, which
provides a way to model how agents should behave in a
given social context. The framework distinguishes between
abstract norms and their instantiation into a concrete domain.
It enables the definintion of relevant computational tasks,
such as verification and planning. Notably, the framework
provides support for artifacts, which is of high importance in
robotics, since robots and humans interact and coordinate via
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relevant objects in the environment. We have instantiated the
framework in several application scenarios, and demonstrated
its use in a physical system comprising both humans and
robots. We have also shown how the verification problem can
be cast to a CSP, and how this enables the use of constraint-
based planning and plan execution technology to control a
robot system.
Institution encapsulate all norms, roles and artifacts that are
relevant in a given social context. However, it is often the
case in human societies that several institutions are relevant at
concurrently — e.g., the fact that agets participate in a game
playing institution still requires adherence to the norms of the
“surrounding” school institution. The study of how different
institutions can be related to each other, and how to exploit
these relations in verification and planning, is the topic of
ongoing work. Another interesting avenue of future work is
how to use institutions as a tool for goal reasoning — e.g., if
a robot realizes it needs a new battery, it may decide that the
best way to obtain it is to engage in a trading institution.
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